Introduction
September 2026 marks both the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks and the 20th anniversary of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the first framework in which all UN member states agreed on a shared, rights-based approach to countering terrorism. But as the strategy enters its third decade, experts argue that one of its most consistent blind spots remains local government — even as terrorism and extremism increasingly play out at the city level.
Article Body
The UN strategy, adopted in 2006, has been periodically updated to reflect new threats, including cyber risks, drone technology and gender-based violence, and now formally recognises the roles of civil society, the private sector, media and young people. Yet according to Eric Rosand, global chair of the Strong Cities Network, mayors and municipal leaders remain largely absent from both the strategy’s periodic reviews and broader international discussions on prevention and response — despite cities bearing the brunt of attacks and the work of rebuilding afterward.
Rosand argues that cities are uniquely positioned to prevent terrorism because of their proximity to affected communities and their day-to-day management of the “conditions conducive” to extremism, one of the strategy’s four pillars. He points to research from the Strong Cities Network showing that frontline municipal workers — including teachers, librarians, youth workers, faith leaders and community organisers — are often the first to notice early warning signs.
Municipal governments also oversee much of the physical and social infrastructure most exposed to attacks, from transit systems and stadiums to markets, schools and places of worship, while their control over housing, employment and mental health services makes them central to reintegrating former extremist offenders and returning fighters, in line with UN Security Council resolutions on the issue.
Examples From Four Cities
Rosand cites several municipal-led initiatives as evidence the strategy’s goals are already being implemented locally, often more effectively than national programmes alone.
In Nansana, Uganda, concerns over potential spillover violence linked to Allied Democratic Forces activity across the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo prompted local authorities to build a community-based early-warning system, adapted from a neighbourhood-watch model used in Stellenbosch, South Africa. More than 200 residents and officials were trained and over 30 neighbourhood groups formed, combining patrols with community dialogue and a direct channel to flag concerns to the mayor’s office.
In Fes, Morocco, city officials responded to growing distrust among young residents by co-designing a youth engagement strategy rather than imposing one. After nine rounds of consultation involving more than 90 young people and community representatives, the city established a Communal Youth Council in February 2025, giving young residents — including those from marginalised neighbourhoods considered more vulnerable to radicalisation — a formal role in shaping municipal policy and proposing initiatives to counter hate and polarisation.
In London, the mayor’s Shared Endeavour Fund has channelled more than £3 million since 2020 into grassroots organisations working to counter hate, intolerance and radicalisation, including programmes helping young people identify and challenge extremist narratives online. Evaluations by the Strong Cities Network have linked the initiatives to stronger protective factors against radicalisation.
In Mechelen, Belgium, local police and social workers have built joint mechanisms to identify and support individuals at risk of violent extremism or organised crime, sharing information through small committees and coordinating interventions through regular case meetings involving police, justice and social service representatives.
A Stalled UN Debate
Despite these examples, Rosand says municipal contributions are rarely mentioned when member states report on the strategy’s implementation, and local leaders are largely excluded from UN debates on issues cities handle directly — from protecting public spaces to supporting victims and facilitating community dialogue after attacks.
He argues that after nine reviews over two decades, those debates have become repetitive, focused more on institutional architecture and long-standing disagreements — including over the definition of terrorism and how it should be criminalised — than on practical, locally led solutions. This July, disagreement among member states, driven largely by US resistance, led the UN General Assembly to fail for the first time in the strategy’s 20-year history to reach consensus on its renewal, forcing a vote instead.
Rosand notes that the theme resurfaced at the Sixth Strong Cities Global Summit in December 2025, where local leaders called for greater UN support, more tailored tools and capacity-building, and a more direct role in shaping global and national counterterrorism strategy.
Why This Matters
With terrorism and extremism increasingly rooted in local grievances, Rosand argues that durable prevention strategies depend on empowering the governments closest to affected communities. He contends that sidelining cities in favour of debates over UN architecture and funding risks limiting the strategy’s real-world impact just as it enters its third decade.
What Happens Next?
Rosand argues the UN and its member states now face a choice about whether to give cities and municipalities — regardless of size or region — a formal seat at the table, along with the recognition and resources to scale up existing local prevention efforts.
Source: Eric Rosand, Global Chair of the Strong Cities Network (Institute for Strategic Dialogue) — opinion piece; views are the author’s own.
